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THE FUNCTIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
RICHARD 0. BROOKS *
D ISCUSSIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION customarily are neatly divided
into the areas of either constitutional law or political theory.
Constitutional law deals with particular constitutional clauses and
their case law interpretation. Political theory deals with problems
such as the nature, origin and value of the Constitution. Seldom
does constitutional legal inquiry explore its political theory assump-
tions.I Seldom does political theory examine its implications for
particular constitutional clauses. 2
The purpose of this paper is to join inquiry in both areas; to
explore the meaning of the first amendment establishment clause of
the United States Constitution in light of its broader context of
inquiries into the nature of the whole constitution and its purposes.
The Nature and Purpose of the Constitution
A constitution may be defined as a deliberate and conscious attempt
to organize the offices and powers of government in the form of
* B.A., M.A., University of Chicago; LL.B., Yale University.
'Customarily, constitutional law and legal commentary states the immediate
political theory relevant to particular constitutional clauses with explicit inquiry
into the nature and purposes of the constitution. In courses of constitutional
law, "the constitution" is usually replaced by a concern over "judicial review."
This bias is reflected also in articles relevant to the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY
(1960); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
2 One of the central failures of such political theory is the absence of any
systematic inquiry into the practical consequences of such theorizing. For
practitioners, i.e., lawyers, government administrators, and politicians, such
theory seems irrelevant to day-to-day problems. An excellent exception is
M. ADLER, ART AND PRUDENCE (1937).
explicitly stated rules.3 These rules may
be articulated by supreme courts, written
"constitutions" or widely understood cus-
toms of the structure and operation of
government.
When an attempt to establish a con-
stitution is contemplated, and when an
attempt is made to define or interpret
the constitution, the purposes of having a
constitution come into view. The consti-
tution may be understood in terms of
four purposes. The first purpose of the
constitution is to consciously attempt to
state a coherent relationship between the
major institutions and offices of govern-
ment. Thus, the constitution implies that
certain institutions cohere or go along
with one another more easily than other
mixtures of institutions and powers. 4 It
is this focusing upon the whole complex
of government institutions which gives the
constitution its broad and inclusive con-
notation. The second purpose of the or-
ganization of offices or powers is to pro-
vide a channel within which the govern-
3 Such a definition applies best to the American
Constitution, but not the English Constitution,
the latter being an historically derived organ-
ization of offices and powers. No definition is
completely adequate to cover the loose usage
ot the term "constitution." For an excellent
short discussion of the term, see 1 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 233 (R.
Hutchins ed. 1952).
4 Little attention is given to the coherence of
institutions where there is room for accidental
growth and variety as there was in America
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
In twentieth century America, the convergence
and interpenetration of institutions demand
attention to the relationship between institu-
tions. The Constitution forms a framework
focusing upon the problems of producing such
a "coherence."
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ment may operate. This "channel" allows
for stable expectations by the rulers and
the ruled of the duties and privileges of
the rulers and the ruled. There is an
economy of energy and thought which a
constitution produces by establishing
stable and routine ways in which the
government and the people are organized.
A third purpose of a constitution as the
organization of powers and offices of gov-
ernment is to provide a standard by
which future changes in governmental
practices and operation may be measured.
As a standard, the constitution provides
for the possibility of focusing upon un-
anticipated accretions of power resulting
from ad hoc isolated governmental ac-
tions which would be easily hidden if
left unmeasured by a constitution. Thus,
the constitution serves as an intellectual
rule for calling to the attention of the
citizens and the government possible sig-
nificant changes in the structure of insti-
tutions in American society.5 The fourth
purpose of the constitution is to articu-
late the ideal structure of governmental
offices and powers, and as written, act as
a reminder of this idea to the citizens
and to the government. In this sense,
"the constitution" is not simply a term
for referring to descriptive events within
5 The concept of a constitution need not imply
a stable form, although some political theorists
such as Aristotle have emphasized such sta-
bility. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. V, ch. 8.
The concept of ordered growth of the state
made possible not by determined and un-
conscious forces but by deliberate action by
the state's participants is one basis of con-
stitutionalism. See THE FEDERALIST No. 1
(Hamilton).
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
a society but, also, a term for referring
to stated ideals of that society.'
Any specific constitutional clause will
therefore have to be understood in terms
of these four purposes of the constitu-
tion: stability, coherence, ordered growth,
and fulfillment of ideals. The first
amendment establishment clause of the
United States Constitution, "Congress
shall make no law respecting the estab-
lishment of religion," can be understood
only in terms of: (1) defining, in rela-
tion to the rest of the Constitution, the
way in which church and government are
to be related, in coherence with the def-
initions and purposes of government con-
tained in the other parts of the Consti-
tution; (2) providing a channel of stable
expectations through which church and
government relations may be defined; (3)
providing a standard by which to focus
upon any possible change in church and
government relations through ad hoc gov-
ernment or church actions; (4) defining
the ideal relationship to obtain between
church and government.
In the remaining parts of this paper,
these four purposes of the Constitution
will be examined in light of the estab-
lishment clause and the establishment
clause in light of the Constitution's four
purposes. In the first section, the estab-
6 For those philosophers who abhor "norma-
tive ambiguity," the mixing of the "is" and
"ought," see H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN,
POWER AND SOCIETY (1950). The Constitution
is a very unclear document. Would it be
possible to have two constitutions-one stating
the actual existing organization of institutions
and another stating the ideal towards which
we move? Or does such a suggestion ignore
the artistic and rhetorical quality of the
written document?
lishment clause shall be examined as part
of an entire constitution which attempts
to define the relationship between offices
and powers of the government so that a
coherence of these offices and powers will
result. In the second section, the estab-
lishment clause shall be examined as a
channel through which the government
powers can operate. In the third section,
the establishment clause will be examined
as a standard by which the people and
the courts may focus upon unanticipated
accretions of power which may change
the relationships between church and gov-
ernment. In the final section, the estab-
lishment clause will be examined as an
ideal organization of powers yet to be
realized, but, nevertheless, defined in a
written constitution.
I
The establishment clause is part of a
constitution which organizes or distributes
the powers of government in relation to
matters concerning the church and re-
ligion. One of the purposes of the Con-
stitution is to provide for a coherence of
the major institutions within society.
This establishment clause must be under-
stood as only part of a complete constitu-
tional statement of coherence 7 between
7There are two types of "coherence." The
first is an intellectual logical coherence within
the justifications for political institution. Thus,
the justification for a representative form of
government must not contradict the justifica-
tion for a Supreme Court if the two institu-
tions are to "cohere" within the same Con-
stitution. This is the kind of coherence ex-
amined here. A second type of "coherence"
is the absence of practical conflict of such
institutions in operation. M. ADLER & M.
MAYER, THE REVOLUTION IN EDUCATION 55-63
(1958).
government and religion. To understand
the establishment clause, one must inter-
pret the entire Constitution's attempt to
state the relations of church and govern-
ment." The Constitution, in many of its
parts, contains implications for church-
government relations. The preamble does
not state the origin of the power of gov-
ernment to be in God. Rather, the origin
of government is in "We, the People." If
government originates, at least proximate-
ly, from the people's consent, the gov-
ernment cannot claim or justify the sup-
port or aid to one church on the ground
that the government is an agent of God
through that church since government is
rather an agent of "We, the People." 9
Nor can government aid to churches be
justified on the ground that the govern-
ment, by such aid, is honoring its orig-
inator, since the origin of government
lies in the people. Thus, the preamble of
the Constitution, by locating the proxi-
mate origin of the Constitution in gov-
ernment in the people rather than in God
implies that the relationship between gov-
ernment and religion is mediated by the
people and the consent of the people.
Any relationship between church and
government must thus be compatible with
the consent of the people. This is im-
portant because, in a pluralistic society
such as the United States, the consent of
" Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not
viewed the establishment clause in relation
to the clauses of the total constitution.
9 There are phrases in Aquinas' On Kingship
which can be construed as conceiving the
government as "an agent" of God. This be-
lief may underlie any Catholic's uneasiness
with the Constitution itself.
13 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1967
the people would not and cannot be given
to government support of only one of the
many religious groups. Moreover, in a
partially secularist American society, the
consent of the whole people cannot be
given to aid all churches. 10
The Preamble
The preamble of the Constitution states
the purposes of the Constitution: unity,
peace, justice, common defense, general
welfare, and liberty. This preamble omits
any reference to the spiritual develop-
ment of man or man's salvation. Al-
though it is possible to read a religious
content into the stated purposes, there is
no explicit mention of religious purposes
contained in the preamble of the Consti-
tution. Therefore, the preamble appears
to reflect the deliberate choice of the
founders to organize the power of gov-
ment for non-religious purposes. 1 The
American Constitution is, in this sense, a
commitment to a secular national gov-
"'This argument based upon consent ignores
the qualifications of the consent theory by
political theory eroding literal consent to "vir-
tual consent." For an excellent summary and
interpretation of the consent theory, see A.
GEWIRTH, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1-30 (1965).
The Preamble of the Constitution contains the
belief that government, in some sense, depends
upon the consent of the people. However,
the supporters of government aid to churches
and many other acute political theorists may
implicitly, in their arguments, reject the con-
sent theory of government. It is worth noting
that both neo-thomistic and pragmatic philoso-
phers may reject the conception that the origin
of the government rests in "We, the People."
This suggests that one point of difference
between "separatists" and "establishmentarians"
may rest upon their different conceptions as
to the role of "consent" in political theory.
"THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison).
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ernment, rather than a "sacral state."' 2
This means that the government cannot
justify support of churches on the
grounds that the spiritual development of
man and his salvation is a proper pur-
pose of government.1 3 The establishment
clause, if read in conjunction with this
preamble which omits any reference to
religious purposes, appears to exclude the
possibility of aid to churches in order to
promote spiritual development of the
citizens .14
Article I
Article I of the Constitution provides
the basis for a representative legislature.
Implicit in article I are the founders'
arguments for the desirability of the rep-
12 For a summary of the "sacral state" theory,
see J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 147-87
(1951).
13This justification of "Establishment" with
variations permeates Catholic thought: Aquinas,
On Kingship; J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE
STATE 149 (1951); M. Adler & W. Farrell,
The Theory of Democracy, in 4 THE THoMIST
312, 333 n.257 (1942).
14 A second debate can revolve around the
stated purposes of the preamble. Supporters
of one or another form of government and
of religion may believe contrary to our
founding fathers that the government can and
should participate in promoting man's spiritual
development.
Unfortunately, three separate questions are
often tangled together in a discussion of this
topic: (1) Is the government capable of taking
any action which might promote spiritual de-
velopment? (2) If government is capable of
promoting spiritual development of the indi-
vidual, at what price, and is that price worth
paying? (3) Even if the government is capable
of promoting spiritual development and such
action would not be costly, is it the role of
the Supreme Court through judicial review to
make additions to the purposes of the Con-
stitution?
resentative form of government. The
tenth Federalist Paper argues for a rep-
resentative form of government as the
best form to provide the framework for
containing "factions," i.e., interest
groups.' One of the "factions" was un-
derstood to be the religious sect. Thus,
the draftsmen of the Constitution viewed
a religious sect as a "faction" potentially
threatening the peace and public welfare
of the country and representation was
seen as a method to neutralize this fac-
tion. If representation is seen as a meth-
od for neutralizing factions, it would
seem that article I of the Constitution
which sets down the basis of such repre-
sentation would be a sufficient method
for neutralizing religious factions, and
thus the establishment clause would not
be needed. Indeed, since the Constitu-
tion did not originally include any of the
Bill of Rights, one might argue that the
founders viewed the representative system
itself as a sufficient guarantee of religious
peace. Further, one might well argue
that the representative principle does suc-
ceed, through pluralistic voting groups,
in preventing any establishment of one
particular religious sect. However, al-
though the representative system might
prevent government support to one par-
ticular religious sect, the representative
principle may not prevent government aid
to various religious groups. Thus, it
would be easy to foresee the people of
varying faiths joining in a program by
which government might aid each and
every one of those faiths. The very fact
that the establishment clause was added
15THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison).
to article I suggests that the founders
may have hoped that such a clause would
prevent what article I could not prevent,
namely, government aid to any religion. 16
Contained in the Federalist view of re-
ligion as a potential "faction" is the view
of religion as a social group which is po-
tentially dangerous to the peace. Religion
is viewed as becoming warped into a pos-
sible object of self-interest rather than a
necessary contributor to the common
good. Thus, in the theory underlying
article I of the Constitution is the found-
ers' belief in the "factional" character of
religion and the distorted self-interest
character which religion may have. If
this view of religion underlies article I
of the Constitution, it is difficult to see
how the establishment clause could be
interpreted in any way which contradicted
the theory of article I. Therefore, the
establishment clause should have, as an
underlying presumption, that religious
groups may act in their self-interest and
may be counter to the common good and
may threaten the peace. Two inferences,
however, may be drawn from such a pre-
sumption: first, that no aid should be
given to religions since such religions
may be counter to the common good; and
second, that aid may be given only when
religions serve a public purpose.
16This type of argument is dangerous be-
cause it rests upon the assumption that the
founders' omniscience would result in no
overlapping of constitutional clauses. It is
quite possible that the founders did not really
remember the protective purpose of representa-
tion when they created the establishment
clause.
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Separation of Powers
Articles I, II, and III of the Constitu-
tion set forth the legislative, executive
and judicial powers of the government.
These articles imply a division of powers
in which the legislative, the judicial and
executive powers are separated, and in
which there is a potential system of
checks and balances. The division of
powers and the system of checks and
balances are understood to purposefully
limit government power by pitting ambi-
tion against ambition;" the division is
based upon the presumption that "men
and not angels must rule men." Thus,
the authors of the Constitution rely upon
a system of enumerated powers, a divi-
sion of governmental powers and checks
and balances in order to prevent the de-
velopment of tyranny in government.
Completely missing from the founders'
conception of the limitations of govern-
ment and the way in which tyranny
should be prevented is the medieval con-
cept of mixed government without separa-
tion of powers and checks and balances.18
The medieval conception of government
relied upon the religious education of the
ruler and the religious sanctity of the sub-
jects in order to limit tyranny. 19 The
founders did not look to religious educa-
tion or to the concept of religious sanc-
tity of the subjects in order to limit the
powers of government.
17THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (Madison); THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (Hamilton or Madison).
18A "mixed" government for Aquinas was
not a government of separation of powers
but merely a device to give the citizen a
sense of participation.
19 Aquinas, On Kingship.
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Twentieth century neo-thomist philoso-
phers such as Jacques Maritain and Mor-
timer Adler argue that Christianity can
contribute to the success of democracy.20
However, the Constitution appears to re-
ftect the founders' belief that institutional
arrangements must be used in order to
prevent tyranny and preserve democracy.
By implication, the founders appear to
believe that religious beliefs are insuf-
ficient to prevent tyranny. This distrust
of religion as a sufficient method of in-
suring democracy should also be read in-
to the establishment clause of the first
amendment. Therefore, government aid
to religions on the grounds that religion
can support democracy does not appear
to be compatible with the founders'
theory of the separation of powers. Such
an argument, however, does not meet the
counter argument that although religion
is not a sufficient check on the growth of
tyranny, it certainly is a necessary factor
along with other institutional arrange-
ments.
Summary
If one attempts to understand the
meaning of the establishment clause in
relation to the other clauses of the Con-
stitution, one coherent view of religion
emerges according to which the people
consent to form governments (preamble)
for secular purposes (preamble), and do
not rely upon religious sanctions to pre-
vent tyranny but rather upon the division
of powers and representation (articles I,
II, 111) because religion may be a self-
interested faction not contributing to the
20 J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 108-46
(1951); M. Adler & W. Farrell, The Theory
of Democracy, in 4 THE THOMIST (1942).
common good (article I). Without at-
tempting to examine the question, it may
be asked whether an "establishmentarian-
ism" position would have to modify or
counter each of these assertions, or
whether a modification of one or an-
other of these tenets would be sufficient
to justify government aid to religion. In
any case, the process of relating the es-
tablishment clause to the rest of the Con-
stitution broadens the church-state debate
to encompass the problem of finding
theories of church-state relations which
are conformable with theories of repre-
sentation, division of powers, and the
origin and purpose of government.
II
The meaning of the establishment
clause can be approached from the point
of view of another purpose of the Con-
stitution, viz., to channel government
powers in their operation. These chan-
nels are, in fact, the shared expectations
of the citizens and the legal specialists of
a community as to the proper exercise of
governmental powers. Thus, the phrase,
"Congress shall pass no law respecting
the establishment of religion" may be
viewed as a pointer to a cultural con-
sensus in America on the proper relation-
ship between church and government.
Judicial review which "interprets" this
clause then functions to preserve the ex-
pectations of non-violation of the cultural
consensus, thus either limiting the areas
of governmental function or permitting
"and legitimating" governmental func-
tions.2
21 For a discussion of "legitimation" as a
function of the constitution, see C. BLACK,
Since the stability of expectations
which forms the basis for channeling
government powers refers to the expecta-
tion of current living members of society,
the extent to which the Constitution re-
flects the expectations of citizens or con-
stitutional founders in 1787 is of limited
value. The expectations of the citizens
of 1787 are only relevant as possible in-
dications of present expectations to the
extent that there is a continuity of polit-
ical culture. 2
2
The indices of political culture or com-
munity consensus behind the Constitution
are: (1) the judges' and legislators' in-
tuitions of political culture; and (2) po-
litical and sociological information on
current political culture.2"
Judges' and legislators' intuitions of
political culture are based upon history
and shared values of the community.
When judges review the history of
church-state relations as an indicium of
the present American consensus on
church-state relations, these judges place
reliance upon selected historical docu-
THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW
IN A DEMOCRACY (1960).
22Thus, the discussion of the importance of
the founders' constitutional intentions must
distinguish between the constitution as an at-
tempt to produce coherence between institutions
(and relevant issues of consent) where the
founders' views may be relevant, and the
constitution as a device for channeling the
operations of government through consensus
or shared expectations which may change
through time and hence, where the founders'
views may be irrelevant to the present.
2 For a discussion of the relation of the law
to culture, see Repouille v. United States,
165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947), and J. COHEN,
R. ROBSON & A. BATES, PARENTAL AUTHORITY:
THE COMMUNITY AND THE LAW (1958).
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ments such as Madison's Remonstrance 24
or Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Re-
ligious Liberty 25 to determine the polit-
ical consensus. These documents reveal
that the purposes of the establishment
clause were to eliminate religious persecu-
tion, religious strife and to promote free-
dom of religion and to maintain the sep-
aration of church and government. These
purposes rest upon several assumptions
of the founders.
The draftsmen of the first amendment
establishment clause shared the historical
assumption that establishment of religion
in the past had caused religious strife.
The assumption was derived from the
recent experience of intolerance in Eng-
land and Europe as well as in the early
colonies. 26 It was further derived from
the analysis of this historical experience
by such theorists as John Locke and Vol-
taire.27 As a result, these theorists saw a
necessary correspondence between civil
peace and disestablishmentarianism.
A second assumption of the founders
was that the separation of church and
state was a means to religious freedom.
The founders appealed to disestablish-
21 Madison's Remonstrance as found in the
Appendix to Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 63 (1947) and hereinafter cited as
"Madison's Remonstrance."
25 T. JEFFERSON, Autobiography, in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 62 (P. Ford
ed. 1892).
26 GREEN, 2 HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE
197-365; GREEN, 3 HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH
PEOPLE 3-37; W. JORDAN, 1-4 THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND
(1932-40).
27 J. LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERA-
TION (1800); F. VOLTAIRE, A TREATISE ON
RELIGIOUS TOLERATION (1764).
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ment in terms of religious freedom.2 8 The
founders understood that separation be-
tween church and state promoted religious
freedom in the following ways: (1) the
establishment clause prevented one
church, with the aid of government, from
persecuting, that is, interfering with the
religious freedom of other religions; 29 (2)
disestablishment prevented the compul-
sory taxation of a citizen of one religion
for the benefit of another religion; 30 (3)
disestablishment protected the churches
from dependence on government and con-
sequent governmental pressures; 1  (4)
separation of church and government al-
lowed the free competition of religion. 2
Each one of these freedoms had a spe-
cial appeal at the time of the writing of
the Constitution. The fear of persecution
and religious strife was a very real and
immediate fear based upon events of per-
secution and religious wars in recent Eng-
lish history and in the American col-
onies. 33 This persecution stemmed from
less concern for human life and pain, the
belief in the possibility of the success of
persecution, and a deeper commitment to
religious values.3 4  The fear of compul-
sory taxation to support religious groups
whose religion may differ from the po-
28 Madison's Remonstrance; T. JEFFERSON,
Autobiography, supra note 25.
29 Madison's Remonstrance.
30 Ibid; Jefferson's Bill for the Establishment
of Religious Freedom, supra note 25.
31 Madison's Remonstrance.
32 The clearest statement of free competition
for religion is in Jefferson's Bill for the Estab-
lishment of Religious Freedom, supra note 25.
33 GREEN, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE,
supra note 26.
34 W. JORDAN, 1-4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF
RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND (1932-40).
tential taxpayer must be understood
against the background of the history of
English dissent in colonial problems.
English dissenters continually protested
against contribution to the established
church. This protest against the English
church tax was a protest against the
whole scheme of legislation which made
the dissenters second-class citizens.3 5 At
the same time, the rapid migration of
religious groups to America resulted in
situations where the majority of citizens
were being taxed to support a minority
church group. The founders of the Con-
stitution feared dependence of church
upon government. This fear was based
upon the belief that power corrupts and
that giving the church the power of gov-
ernment would corrupt the church. 6 This
view of power was derived in part from
a long history of political theory and
political history in which power came to
be viewed as a necessary and dangerous
evil, rather than a means derived ulti-
mately from God for promoting the com-
mon good. The founders of the estab-
lishment clause created that clause in an
era when the laissez-faire doctrine was
in development. Religious establishment,
like economic mercantilism, appeared to
threaten the free competition of religious
ideals and ideas.37
A third assumption of the writers of
2. R. COWHERD, THE POLITICS OF ENGLISH
DISSENT 1, 86, 87, 89, 94, 99 (1956).
' Madison's Remonstrance.
37The laissez-faire ideal entered into Locke's
concept of a "free and voluntary society."
J. LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
(1800). See also S. FINES, LAISSEZ-FAIRE
AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE (1956).
the Constitution was that the separation
of church and government is a desirable
end in itself. Separation was viewed as
desirable because the church and gov-
ernment had essentially different pur-
poscs, organization, personnel and
origin 0s
If judges arrived at historical conclu-
sions on the basis of these selected his-
torical documents, such conclusions
would rely completely on a neat surgical
operation of all the available historical
materials. If the history of the times is
re-examined closely, a new historical pic-
ture emerges. The founders, especially
Jefferson, were not necessarily represen-
tative of the prevailing culture in their
attitudes toward religion." It is possible
to make the argument that the founders
were much more biased toward separa-
tion of church and government than the
bulk of the population. There is, per-
haps, insufficient attention given to the
fact that there were establishments of one
religion at the time of the drafting of the
Constitution within the states and there
was widespread aid to religion. 40 More-
over, modern thinkers are probably un-
able to imagine the integration between
everyday culture and religion existing in
colonial times. Unlike today, the church
was much more a center of community
life and religious practices permeated
38 Madison's Remonstrance.
3 M. BELOFF, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND AMER-
]CAN DEMOCRACY 7 (Collier Books 1962).
The book gives a brief account of Jefferson's
fight in Virginia with the establishmentarians.
4) See, for example, the Connecticut situation.
R. OSTERWEIS, THREE CENTURIES OF NEW
HAVEN 1638-1938, at 85-91 (1953).
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colonial customs to a much greater ex-
tent.41
Such counter-evidence to the tradition-
al kinds of historical evidences given to
interpret the meaning of the establishment
clause results in the conclusion that his-
tory probably does not reveal any stable
community expectations upon the mean-
ing of the establishment clause in 1781.
This is hardly surprising but it is worth
emphasizing because of the partisan argu-
ments which have tended to distort the
essential fact of the ambiguity of political
culture in colonial times. The conclusion
to be drawn is that history does not yield
common expectations which may guide
the relations of church and government.
If we turn from the historical evidence
of the cultural consensus on the estab-
lishment clause to sociological and polit-
ical science evidence of the current con-
sensus in regard to the establishment
clause, a similar ambiguity as to the
meaning of the establishment clause re-
sults. If one examines the Supreme
Court opinions as a sample reflecting gen-
eral American political culture, one
would find that the opinions are extreme-
ly nebulous. Aside from the customary
Supreme Court split opinions,'42 there is
a doctrinal vagueness which runs through-
out the opinions. A "wall of separa-
tion" 13 and "no aid to religion" 44 is
.11 Ibid. See also A. SIMPSON, PURITANISM IN
OLD AND NEW ENGLAND (1955).42 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947).
C'Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
44 Ibid.
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countered by the somewhat strained re-
spect for health and welfare measures,"5
and "no hostility" 46 toward religion.
However, even if unanimity of under-
standing can be read into Supreme Court
opinions, these opinions obviously do not
necessarily reflect the culture of our
times. These opinions do not reflect this
political culture to the extent that they
ignore the great changes in religious life
in America in the last 150 years. Al-
though in many areas of constitutional
change, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the need for deliberately interpret-
ing the constitutional clauses in order to
adjust that clause to the changed circum-
stances, the Supreme Court has refused
(with few exceptions) to recognize the
changing role of the church in American
society in its process of interpreting the
establishment clause. Nevertheless, such
change in the role of the American
church has occurred. These changed cir-
cumstances have altered the extent to
which the original purposes of the estab-
lishment clause are still valid.
Civil strife, infringement of religious
freedom, and union of church and govern-
ment may no longer be threatened by
government aid to religion. There are
many forces which may make strife be-
tween religious sects less of a threat to
peace today in American society.47 There
has been a multiplication of conflicting
V, Ibid.
4G McCoIum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948).
47 See Religious Conflict in the U.S., 12
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES (1956).
parties which has diffused the struggle.4 8
Differences between different sects, be-
tween religious and secular forces, be-
tween "religiosity" and "non-religiosity"
have arisen. Different religions share simi-
lar religious values and different religions
also share similar secular values. There is
also a low intensity of religious belief on
the part of many citizens. Non-religious
participants also tend to mitigate the re-
ligious struggle. 4' Religious conflicts
within individuals and within sects weak-
en conflicts between the sects. (Religious
conflicts may become more localized if
the diffusion of religious groups or mem-
bers throughout the society results in
eliminating religious ghettos.) The man-
ner of religious conflict has become more
indirect by centering upon political issues
rather than on the direct doctrinal re-
ligious disputes °0  Moreover, the chan-
neling of aggression for or against the
secular creed of communism may mean
a decline in the aggression channeled in
religious beliefs. The growth of bureau-
cratic churches also may tend to diminish
the conflict. The representational system
of government in a pluralistic society may
mitigate opportunity for religious conflict.
Expansion of the country since colonial
times also makes nationwide religious
conflict much less likely. Also, the
growth of other powerful institutions di-
minishes the strength of the church's
4s Ibid.
49 See Williams, Religion, Value Orientations
and Inter-Group Conflict, 12 JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL ISSUES 5 (1956).
r0 Social Cleavage and Religious Conflict, 12
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES (1956).
power and, hence, the seriousness of any
conflict between different churches. It
may be argued that even the free market
economy tends to diminish religious con-
flict by separating production and con-
sumption from religious considerations. 5
All of these social changes may tend to
make the fear of religious conflict, which
existed in the time of our founders of the
United States, an unreal fear in modern
American society. If this is so, then one
of the main reasons for preventing aid to
religion has disappeared.
The fear of infringement of religious
freedom by compulsory taxation, church
dependence upon government, and in-
fringement of free competition between
religions still exist, although the grounds
for such fear today seem weak. Perhaps
the lack of any recent serious infringe-
ment upon free exercise of religion within
America contributes to a sense of safety
from such infringement. Compulsory tax-
ation for support to churches is less of-
fensive today because we are compelled
to support a wide variety of programs
which may offend our political, economic,
and social beliefs. Moreover, aid to re-
ligion now occurs in an indirect manner,
lumped together with other taxes and
hidden from the public gaze, thus making
it less offensive. Some forms of "depend-
ence" upon government are accepted.
Safe sewerage, police and fire protection
and other governmental "aid" are the
standard examples of such indirect gov-
ernment aid to religion. Even the most
51 Perry, Moral Bases of Agreement and
Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society, in ETHICS
AND BIGNESS (1962).
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extreme proponents of separation of
church and state do not suggest that such
aid be withdrawn from the church. 2 As
far as the fear of dependence of the
church upon government is concerned, it
is extremely difficult to measure depend-
ence or determine exactly what is feared
about this dependence.
The fear of infringement of the com-
petition between creeds depends upon an
analogy between the competition between
religious belief and the free market in
economics. The attack upon the validity
of the free economic market ideal may
lead to the questioning of the free re-
ligious market ideal. 3 Moreover, the free
52 L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM
475 (1953).
5aThe free market in economics has "broken
down" to the extent that there are government
competitors and government aided competititors.
This breakdown has occurred due to: (1) gov-
ernment interference to protect "the weak,"
the child, the small farmer, the laborer, and
the woman; (2) government interference where
it is believed that the free market allocation
of resources has failed: price setting, produc-
tion and rent controls; (3) government inter-
ference to increase production; (4) govern-
ment interference where other "non-economic"
values may be at stake, e.g., city planning,
and fall-out shelters.
The free market analogy was extended to the
marketplace of ideas, by, among others, J. S.
Mill and Holmes. A theoretical attack upon
this analogy has been made by Hocking and
Meiklejohn. The practical breakdown of the
marketplace of ideas has occurred: (1) pro-
tection of the hours for minors, etc.; (2) an
increase in the more "rational" allocation of
ideas, i.e., public education; (3) the increase
by government production of ideas through
public education and government research;
(4) the preservation of other values, e.g., the
regulations on parks, street activity, and com-
munity peace.
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market ideal applied to religion ignores
essential differences between religious and
economic groups.54 Therefore, the found-
The most thorough extension of the free
market analogy to religion has been by Pfeffer
in his Creeds in Competition. Practically,
the free market of religions has broken down:
I) to protect the weak through health laws,
adoption laws and work regulations of minors,
(e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944)); (2) government reallocation of re-
ligious resources, i.e., prison chaplains and
army chaplains; (3) the government's increase
in religious ideas which appear to be behind
such items as the recently attempted New York
Regents' oath; (4) the government's sub-
ordination of free play of religion for other
general welfare values, i.e., aid to sectarian
hospitals and schools.
54 As one moves from the economic to the
religious "market" the reasons for government
interference can become more tenuous to the
extent that there may be less agreement on
common religious doctrines than on economic
doctrine. Moreover, the whole analogy from
the economic marketplace to religious market-
place is subject to criticism for four reasons:
(1) The general explanation of the force be-
hind the free market system is the profit
motive. Profit will stimulate economic activity.
However, there is no necessary correlation in
religious competition. Competition may lead
to non-religious skepticism rather than stimu-
lated religious activity.
(2) Profit functions to allocate production
and distribution within an economic system.
There is no evidence that there is any com-
parable working in the religious marketplace.
In fact, the whole meaning of "rational al-
location" of religious resources is difficult to
understand.
(3) The free market model assumes that
"private units" of production and consumption
are possible and desirable. The model does
not probe into the social basis of consump-
tion and production. A parallel view of
religious faiths is that they are privately ar-
rived at and enjoyed. This is Locke's assump-
tion. However, the social origins and frame-
work of religious faith is increasingly being
ers' arguments regarding the fear of in-
fringement upon religious freedom seems
to be less forceful today than they were
at the time of the formulation of the
establishment clause when the free mar-
ket theory was extending its influence.
The ideal of separation between
church and government may be tarnished
by a number of historical changes which
have occurred in American society, the
birth of the Constitution, and new re-
ligious groups which have arrived in
America. Many members of these groups
desire much closer connection between
government and church. These desires
rest upon traditions of theology and phi-
losophy and these traditions challenge the
religious traditions which may be tacitly
built into the establishment clause. The
very concept of religion as a "private af-
fair" is called into question by these
traditions which may view religion as
having important public aspects7 5 At the
same time, some modern Protestant
theology challenges the assumptions be-
hind the desire of separation of church
and government. With the secularization
of American culture and the expansion
of government into the welfare and edu-
cational areas, once monopolized by the
recognized by Protestant theologians. (St.
Thomas was always aware of it; his whole
theory of the theological. virtues reflects it.)
(4) The purpose of free economic markets is
to promote efficient production and allocation
of goods according to effective demand. The
profit margin is the standard of efficiency.
In the marketplace of faiths, there is no
agreed-upon standard of "efficiency." Although
religious truths may be salable, that which
is salable is not necessarily true.
5 See J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS
(1960).
churches, increased governmental func-
tions not accompanied by aid to religion
appear to many to threaten the Christian
culture in America. Therefore, changing
social forces may diminish the desirabil-
ity of separation of church and govern-
ment.
Thus, one can cite a number of his-
torical changes which may make the three
original purposes for the separation of
church and government inapplicable to the
present day. The fear of religious strife,
of infringement upon religious freedom
through government aid and the "inher-
ent" desirability of church and govern-
ment are purposes which have been
weakened by some historical forces.
At the same time, although there may
be modern social forces which mean less
possibility of religious strife resulting
from establishmentarianism, less danger
of infringement of individual freedom by
aid to religion, and less to be feared from
closer connection between church and
state, there are a number of forces with-
in American political culture which indi-
cate the necessity for a new application
of the establishment clause. There has
probably developed a new sensitivity to
the harm that can result from potential
government coercion of religious belief in
school and in other situations." At the
same time, there perhaps has grown a
new sympathy for the free expression of
non-religious and anti-religious beliefs, ' 7
5 But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952).
57 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) for a statement regarding freedom of
non-behavior. One indication of this sym-
pathy is the expanding legal conception of
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which requires protection. Moreover, re-
ligious establishments still appear to be a
volatile issue in particular communities5s
Also, it may be argued that the growing
wealth and political power of larger re-
ligious groups requires a safeguard to
control the growth of these groups by
controlling aid to them. These safeguards
may be especially necessary at a time
when aid to religion can become thor-
oughly hidden in broader government aid
programs. Also, new knowledge has
pointed to subtle social establishmen-
tarianism which still exists without our
American community' u Even if the es-
tablishment clause cannot be used to fight
this establishmentarianism, it nevertheless
can serve as a reminder of the undesir-
ability of such a situation. New knowl-
edge has also pointed out the possible
correlation between an authoritarian per-
sonality and religious beliefs. If an open
and tolerant personality becomes one of
the goals of an American society, to this
extent .perhaps the aid to religious beliefs
would be inconsistent with that aim in
government.
Thus, there is a wide variety of social,
political, and theological changes which
the Supreme Court has not explicitly tak-
en account of in attempting to interpret
the meaning of the establishment clause
from the point of view of the political
culture which lies behind this clause.
However, even if such a consciousness
"religion" itself. See Fellowship of Humanity
v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d
673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
58 See Powell, The School Bus Law, New
Haven Journal Courier, Dec. 5, 1961, at 1.
59G. LENSKI, THE RELIGION FACTOR (1961).
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was reflected in the Supreme Court opin-
ions, these changes could not give an
unambiguous guideline for determining
the meaning of the establishment clause.
Thus, although the establishment clause
is to be looked at as a channel for the
exercise of governmental powers, in the
areas of church-state relations, this chan-
neling cannot be determined by looking
at the shared expectations of the mem-
bers of the community, since these expec-
tations are not shared.
Contemporary social and political
philosophers have expressed considerable
concern over the resolution of conflicting
values and expectations within society.
Charner Perry has suggested that the
economic market, political compromise,
courts, bureaucracies, shared values other
than the conflict values, changes of
values, means-ends reasoning, and appeal
to tradition are all factors which may
contribute to resolving any lack of polit-
ical consensus including the lack of con-
sensus surrounding the establishment
clause. ° All of these factors offer pos-
sible grounds for "finding the meaning"
of the establishment clause in the am-
bivalent political culture of the United
States. Thus, the Court (or the minor-
ity) may point out that Sunday Blue Laws
do not accomplish their avowed purpose
(means-ends reasoning) ,6 that prayers
are customary (appeals to tradition), 62
that coercion of non-christian children is
offensive (shared values), 6 that released-
time instruction not on school property
60Supra note 51.
G1 McGovern v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
2Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
63Supra note 56.
is satisfactory (compromise),6 4 and that
this aid is a health and welfare measure
(because the Court as ultimate arbitrator
says so). ", However, the resolution of
cultural conflicts on such an ad hoc basis
does not provide unambiguous rules for
channeling the operations of the govern-
ment and hence, perpetuates the unsettled
state of American political culture and
American expectations regarding the re-
lationship of church and government.
III
The history of the constitutional in-
terpretations of the commerce clause re-
veals the changing economic and social
powers and functions of federal and state
governments. Although the commerce
clause did not halt this change, it did
provide an opportunity to focus attention
upon the large scale changes in the shape
of American technology. This focus is
not only provided for the Supreme Court,
but also for the legislative representatives,
the executive and the citizenry.
The establishment clause may similarly
be seen to provide a focus upon the
power relations of church and govern-,
ment within America. A federal aid bill
may result in unnoticed and unanticipated
aid to religious organizations. This po-
tential "establishment of religion" can
only be flagged or focused upon if there
is a constitutional provision which calls
to the attention of the legislature, the
courts and the people, unanticipated and
unnoticed consequences of legislation.
64 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948).
"GEverson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
The clauses of the Constitution provide
rules which specify which relationships
between institutions should be focused
upon.66 In reference to the establishment
clause, the Supreme Court in its opinions
has a duty to provide a clear focus upon
the possible changed relationships be-
tween church and government implied by
legislative or executive action.67
The Supreme Court, in its church-state
opinions, has failed to provide a focus
upon the choices of differing arrange-
ments of power between the church and
government. There is no opinion which
thoroughly deliberates the choice as to
whether the relationship of churches and
state government are similar to the rela-
tionships between churches and federal
government. There is no United States
Supreme Court opinion which deliberately
decides whether government aid to sec-
tarian institutions, i.e., churches, and
schools, has similar power implications as
government aid to direct religious insti-
tutions such as churches. The Court has
not explicitly weighed whether the gov-
ernment aid in the form of criminal sanc-
16 This statement obviously is qualified in one
sense, namely, the Constitution itself pays
little explicit attention to institutions such as
unions, corporations, executive bureaucracies,
and the military. This lack of mention of
institutions other than government is probably
a carryover from the individualistic philosophy
of John Locke and the state of these institu-
tions at that time. Nevertheless, it is obvious
that the Court itself, in its judicial review, can
take note of the existence of growth of these
institutions.
67The first amendment refers to "religion"
not to "churches." Nevertheless, the "establish-
ment of religion" clause implies the existence
of churches.
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tions against discrimination against per-
sons on the basis of their religious belief
is the same as government financial aid
to religious institutions. The Supreme
Court has indeed, by implication, decided
all of these issues. However, within its
opinions, it has not explicitly weighed the
alternatives. Rather, the Supreme Court
has hidden the structure of constitutional
choices which continually faces the Court
and the American people in the area of
church-state relations. One of the func-
tions of a Supreme Court opinion would
be to explore and deliberate in an explicit
manner on these particular choices which
face the American people.
The Supreme Court must not only pro-
vide a focus upon the constitutional
changes in America; it must also make
decisions legitimating or terminating leg-
islation. These decisions must be under-
stood as decisions about the proper rela-
tions of the power structure in a country.
These decisions should be intended to
preserve a stable power structure within
the country by allowing or checking
changes within that power structure. The
Supreme Court and lower courts, through
judicial review, provide a mechanism for
deliberate and organized constitutional
change. The task of the Supreme Court
and constitutional theorists is thus to de-
fine the criteria necessary for choosing
to allow organized and deliberate change.
Although the Supreme Court has not
articulated the general criteria to deter-
mine organized and peaceful constitution-
al change, there appear to be three
criteria for such change.68 The first cri-
68 The three criteria are derived from Aristotle's
treatment of how to preserve the state from
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terion would be whether the constitution-
al change resulting from legislation so
substantially alters the balance of institu-
tions that peace is threatened by the
resulting imbalance of these institutions.
The second criterion is whether the pro-
posed change increases the power of the
legislature or executive to the extent that
an abuse of power by these institutions
would result in a significant infringement
on freedom of the individual which could
not be constitutionally rectified. The
third criterion is whether the proposed
change leads toward a form of govern-
nent ideally suited to the American so-
ciety. If legislation or executive action
results in a substantial alteration of the
balance of institutions so that peace is
threatened, if legislation would result in
infringement of individual freedom, if the
proposed change does not lead toward a
form of government ideally suited to
American society, the court may invali-
date the legislation.
The first standard of required peaceful
change depends upon the Court's ability
to predict when changes in institutions
may lead to revolution. Such a predic-
tion rests, at best, upon political wisdom
about the social forces in the country and
historical knowledge of the origins of
past revolutions. Such a prediction will
be undoubtedly difficult; nevertheless,
such a prediction is necessary. The stand-
ards which help to predict revolutionary
potentiality may be the following: Has
the change caused by the legislation or
terminating long standing legislation sig-
revolution in Aristotle's Politics, Book V.
ARISTOTLE, Politics, in BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1232 (McKeon ed. 1941).
nificantly increased the power of one
social group? Is the legislation likely to
result in disrespect for the law as an in-
strument of one pressure group? Is strik-
ing down the legislation likely to result
in revolutionary disrespect for the Consti-
tution? Does the legislation promote or
exaggerate any of the known defects of
republican democracy?
These questions may be asked under
the framework of the United States Con-
stitution in the interpretation of any par-
ticular clause of that Constitution. Within
the establishment clause itself, these
questions may be asked regarding legis-
lation affecting religious groups. For ex-
ample, the Court could ask about the
released time program: Is the proposed
new released time program part of a
trend which would eventually cause a dis-
proportionate increase in power of the
church? Would the released time pro-
gram prompt a sense of fear in a sig-
nificant group of the population? Would
a released time law be viewed with dis-
respect by parts of the population as a
law which results from one pressure
group? Would the terminating of released
time programs be likely to result in dis-
respect for the Constitution or judicial
review?
A second standard of constitutionally
organized change is whether the change
would increase the power of government
to the extent that the power, if abused,
would result in a significant infringement
of freedom of the individual, an infringe-
ment which could not be constitutionally
rectified. This standard can be broken
down into four questions: (1) Is the
power of the government increased? (2)
Is there an opportunity for that power to
be abused? (3) If the power were abused,
would a significant infringement of the
individual's freedoms result? (4) Could
the infringement be constitutionally recti-
fied?
Within the establishment clause, these
questions may be directed to, for exam-
ple, the school prayer situation. If the
New York Regents' prayer were consti-
tutionally upheld, state government then
would have the power to compose and
require prayers for the national interest
and have public school children recite
these prayers.'' Is this, however, a sig-
nificant increase of power of the govern-
ment? If the state government has power
to compose prayers in the national in-
terest, can this power be abused? What,
for example, are the checks upon the
Regents' powers? Is the Regent a repre-
sentative political figure? If this power
could be abused, could the above result
in an infringement of freedom of the
individual? In the case of the Regents'
prayer, is the requirement of an atheist
attending public school to recite a prayer,
an infringement upon his freedom if he
were free to go to a private school or not
required to recite the prayer?
Whatever the answers to these questions
may be, they are the questions which
must be asked. No amount of legal so-
phistication can cover these basic ques-
tions with the gloss of legal technicality.
Thus, the Court must make a difficult
estimation of the consequences of legis-
lation and executive action upon the sta-
bility of the country and the freedom of
the individual.
W,)Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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A third standard for reviewing consti-
tutional change is to determine whether
such change leads toward an ideal rela-
tionship of power suitable to the society
and its conditions. This standard is the
subject of the final section of this paper.
IV
The establishment clause may be
viewed as pointing towards an ideal or-
ganization of the institutions and powers
of a country which are not yet realized,
but should be realized in the future.
Thus, the Constitution is not merely a
reflection of a political consensus, but it
also is a statement of what the ideal re-
lationships should be between institutions
in American society.
Two types of ideal constitutions may
be distinguished.-0  First, there is the
"absolute" ideal constitution where the
material circumstances of a country are
imaginatively reconstructed to provide for
an ideal arrangement of power. This is
the utopian ideal-the best constitution
of all constitutions. However, there is a
second type of ideal constitution which is
relatively the best, that is, the best given
that country's particular resources and
limitations. This best American consti-
tution is the best relative to the institu-
tions and resources of America. It is not
the role of judicial review to articulate
the absolutely best constitutional arrange-
ment. Such a task involves the imagina-
tive reconstruction of the resources of a
country which is a massive intellectual
task mainly irrelevant to actual practical
institutional law within a given country.
70This distinction is derived from Aristotle's
Politics. ARISTOTLE, supra note 68, at 1205.
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This task is reserved for the political
philosophers. It is primarily the role of
the Court within the United States to
review constitutional changes in light of
a constitution which is ideally suitable to
the circumstances of the United States.
This latter constitutional arrangement may
not be yet realized in the United States
but may be viewed as a realizable ideal
adjusted to the circumstances of the coun-
try. Thus, although the best form of
government could, for example, be a
limited monarchy with one religion or
secular democracy with no religion, this
ideal is irrelevant to the American so-
ciety.71  The ideal constitutional frame-
work within which judicial review must
operate in America is the situation of
representative pluralism. Any Supreme
Court judicial review must articulate an
ideal which is compatible with the exist-
ence of diverse religious groups within a
representative democracy.
The Supreme Court has completely
failed to examine alternative practical
ideals for church-state relations within
America. Thus, the Court has been com-
pletely absorbed with finding areas of
political consensus through which to
channel the government operations in re-
gard to religion, without attempting to
indulge in the definition of relatively ideal
relationships between church and state.
However, constitutional theorists have
succeeded where the Supreme Court has
failed. Two alternate ideals have been
developed. The first ideal is "laissez-
faire pluralism." This ideal is exposited
by Leo Pfeffer in his books, Church,
See J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE
147-87 (1951).
State and Freedom and Creeds in Com-
petition. A summary of "laissez-faire
pluralism" is:
Religious diversity is desirable in and of
itself. The greatest spiritual good for the
greatest number is most likely to be
achieved if different religions or creeds
compete in "the market place of souls."
This competition between religious
groups allows the individual to freely
choose his faith among competing faiths.
This competition, however, is peaceful.
Hence, it becomes an effective substitute
to more violent forms of religious con-
flict to which religions generally are
prone. The competition should be free
and uncoerced. The state keeps its hands
off. It does not exert pressure or influ-
ence in favor or against any one religion.
There should be no formal intervention
by religious groups into political parties.
There are many difficulties with this
ideal. The ideal depends upon an anal-
ogy between the competition of religious
sects on the one hand and the free eco-
nomic market on the other. I have com-
mented on the weakness of this analogy
above. The free market economy has
been eroded in the last century. Govern-
ment interference to protect the weak,
the child, small farmer, laborer, and the
woman has occurred. Where it is be-
lieved that the free market allocation of
resources has failed, government interfer-
ence such as rent control and production
control has occurred. Government inter-
ference has been allowed in order to
increase production. Finally, government
interference has occurred where non-
economic values may be at stake, for
example, city planning and fallout shelt-
ers. A similar breakdown of the free
market analogy as applied to religion
may be predicted. Thus, one may expect
government interference to protect the
weak through "breach of peace" laws,
health laws, adoption laws and work
regulations of minors,7 2 all of which may
interfere with religious competition. Also,
the government has interfered to reallo-
cate religious "resources" such as prison
chaplains and army chaplains. The gov-
ernment's attempt to increase religious
values appears to be behind such devel-
opments as the recent New York Regents'
oath and released time programs. Also,
the government has ignored "the free
competition" of religion for other general
welfare values even though indirect aid
to religion may result.
There has been a breakdown in the free
market economic system which extends
into the free market religious system.
Moreover, the analogy of the free market
economic system does not apply to the
"free market" religious system. The
general explanation of the force behind
the free-market economic system is the
profit motive. Desire for profit presum-
ably will stimulate economic activity.
However, competition in religion may
lead to non-religious skepticism rather
than stimulated religious activity. Also,
in the economic free market system,
profit functions to allocate production
and distribution within an economic
system. There is no evidence that there
is any comparable working in the reli-
gious marketplace. In fact, the whole
meaning of "rational allocation" of re-
ligious "resources" is nebulous. The free
market economic model assumes that
7 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
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private units of production and consump-
tion are possible and desirable. John
Locke has extended this assumption to
religion.73 However, the social origins
and framework of religious faiths is in-
creasingly being recognized by some
Protestant theologians and was always
recognized by Catholic theology. As a
consequence, one cannot assume "private"
units of production and consumption in
religion. Finally, a purpose of the free
economic market is to promote efficient
production in allocation of goods ac-
cording to effective demands. The profit
margin is a standard of efficiency. In
the marketplace of faith, there is no
agreed-upon standard of "efficiency" in
religious beliefs. Although religious truth
may be salable, that which is salable is
not necessarily true.
The second ideal of church-state rela-
tions has been stated by Catholic philos-
ophers such as Jacques Maritain 7 4 and
John Courtney Murray. 7' This ideal may
be stated as the "church-government
cooperationist ideal." The tenets of this
ideal are the following:
The human person is both part of the
body politic and superior to it through
what is eternal in him and in his final
destination. The spiritual end of man is
the ultimate end and has a 'Primacy'
of spiritual. The churches are institu-
tional means for meeting the spiritual
needs of the person. The church and the
body politic can be distinguished; the
purpose of the latter is common good in
this life; the purpose of the former is
73 J. LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERA-
TION (1800).
74 J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE (1951).
75 J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS
(1960).
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eternal life. An absolute division, how-
ever, between church and body politic is
impossible because both are united with-
in the person. Although it may be ideal-
ly desirable in the ideal state to have a
union of church and state, within the
United States, this ideal has to be ad-
justed to the religious pluralistic situa-
tion. Here, political power is not a sec-
ular island of spiritual power, and faith
is not to be imposed by constraint. Free
inquiry is to be allowed and the free
conscience respected. Within pluralism,
each faith allows, but does not approve
conduct and belief contrary to its faith.
Necessary cooperation between church
and state includes: (1) the indirect as-
sistance of law and order and material
prosperity which a state can promote;
(2) public acknowledgement of the faith
which embodies the majority's tenets of
belief; (3) mutual assistance in both re-
ligious, social and educational work.
There are several difficulties with this
ideal. Contained within the ideal may be
"an intolerance" to non-believers and
non-Christian believers. Also, the church-
state cooperationist ideal does not de-
lineate how the various faiths can be
related within a community. Thus, this
ideal contains no actual substitute for
the questionable principle of competition
in the "laissez-faire separationists" idea.
Various religious thinkers such as Walter
J. Ong and John Courtney Murray have
attempted to substitute the concept of
"dialogue" as the concept which will find
the relationships between various religious
states.7 ' Such a concept however, is
hyper-intellectual and does not account
for the clash between particular institu-
tions and the potential that can result
7'W. Ong, The Religious-Secular Dialogue, in
RELIGION IN AMERICA 170 (1958).
from deep religious beliefs.
A number of intermediate positions
have been offered between these two
particular ideals. These positions in-
clude: (1) the permitting of certain
traditional connections between church
and government such as coin, mottos,
and prayers, but the maintenance of
separation in all other areas;77 (2) the
allowance of state establishmentarianism
but not federal establishmentarianism;
(3) the allowance of government aid
to churches to the extent of preserving
religious freedom, for example, chaplains
in prison;78  (4) the allowance of gov-
ernment aid to sectarian institutions, for
example, schools
(5) the permitting
equal basis to all
the permitting of
time, but not in
or in the form of
not in the form
statutes.
but not churches;7 9
of aid only upon an
denominations; s0 (6)
aid in the form of
the form of money
time and money, but
of coercive criminal
All of these intermediate positions are
not actually intermediate ideals so much
as compromise positions between the
two stated ideals. It remains for a
middle ideal to be stated between the
two ideals which meets the objections
to either ideal.81
77 This appears to be the main thrust of Mr.
Justice Stewart's dissent in Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
r Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty,
in RELIGION IN AMERICA 95 (1958).
7"This was argued for in the Everson case
and has been implied by numerous arguments
of Catholic thinkers.
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s1 The ultimate difficulty with articulating an
ideal statement of the relationship between
Conclusion
In the recent church-state cases, the
Supreme Court has tried to establish its
"neutral" role in relation to religious
beliefs. At the same time, but inde-
pendently, certain constitutional theorists
have attempted to establish that the
Constitution contains certain "neutral"
the church and the government is that such
an effort requires the careful attempt to
understand the nature of religion. Since this
inquiry is productive of great debate and
difference, the Court has attempted to avoid
such ar issue-to remain "neutral." Never-
theless, in order to perform its functions of
defining the ideal relationships between insti-
tutions within America, the Court must engage
in the difficult task of defining the ideal
relationships between church and government
in America. Otherwise, the Court must restrict
its role to focusing open change, demanding
coherence of institutions, and channeling the
government powers.
The defining of relative ideals by the Court
is not always believed to be a function of
the Court. Modern constitutional theorists
criticize such a function because they view
the Court as a basically aristocratic institution
with no special moral wisdom, making deci-
sions in a fundamentally democratic society.
These critics, I believe, ignore several basic
principles underlying the Supreme Court.
First, they ignore the principle that the United
States is a constitutional democracy. A con-
stitution involves objective relationships be-
tween institutions made objective by explicit
rules. Thus, the Court is not merely "invent-
ing" decisions out of its own consciousness,
but deciding in the face of an actual constitu-
tional structure of the nation. Second, we
in America are not merely a representative
democracy, but also a constitutional representa-
tive democracy. As a consequence, we have
allocated in part to the Court the power to
decide large questions relating to the purposes
of the Constitution. One of these purposes
is the definition of relative constitutional
ideals. Opponents of this function of the
Court do not distinguish properly between
13 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1967
principles . 2 Neither the Court nor con-
stitutional theorists have succeeded in
defining clearly what makes these con-
stitutional principles or the Court's judi-
cial review "neutral." The argument
above, however, points to the meaning
of "neutrality," its limits in relation to
judicial review, and the kind of neutrality
which the establishment clause may
have.
First, the Constitution is "neutral" to
the extent that it refers (by explicitly
formulated rules) to objective relation-
ships between institutions within America.
These objective relationships and explicit
rules greatly limit the alternative justifica-
tions which the Supreme Court can give
in making its decisions. Thus, for ex-
ample, it is quite impossible for the
Court to ignore the fact that the institu-
tions of church and government are, for
the most part, distinct institutions. Never-
theless, the vagueness of these constitu-
tional rules and the ambiguity of the
relationships between institutions permits
considerable discretion and expression of
personal preference of the judiciary. In
this latter sense, the Constitution is not
"neutral." Thus, it is the ambiguity of the
actual church-government relations in
United States society which gives the
judiciary considerable discretion in de-
ideals relative to particular society, and ab-
solute ideals which are the province of the
political philosopher. The former requires a
practical deep wisdom and knowledge about
the institutions of our country and the ability
to make decisions in view of ideals relative
to the country's circumstances.
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fining the relationship of church and
government through judicial review.
Second, the Constitution and judicial
review is "neutral" in the sense that the
Constitution distributes and shapes the
form of the government powers, without
specifying directly the particular pur-
poses of the exercise of the power. Thus,
the Court and Constitution do not
initiate and support child labor laws,
foreign aid programs, TVA, etc., although
it may make decisions as to how these
programs affect the constitutional struc-
ture. Yet, insofar as the constitutional
structure intends to promote and empha-
size some purposes rather than other
purposes (as the preamble implies), the
Constitution itself is not "neutral." As we
have seen above, the Constitution does
not appear to be "neutral" in defining
the relationship of church and govern-
ment. The Constitution has taken sides
to the extent of determining that the
government's purpose is not to promote
the spiritual development of man.
Third, the Constitution provides an
instrument for channeling the operations
of government according to certain shared
expectations of the community. Although
these expectations are values, to the
extent that they are shared values, they
appear "neutral," i.e., there is no conflict
to point up their lack of neutrality.
However, we have seen that not all of
the expectations in relation to the rela-
tionships between church and state are
shared. To the extent that values are
not shared by the community, the Court
in deciding cannot be "neutral."
Fourth, the Constitution provides a
focus for unanticipated accretions of
power which threaten freedom and sta-
bility. The Constitution is neutral to
the extent that it is concerned with
stability in itself as well as the selection,
order and direction of change in the
country. Moreover, the Constitution
provides a neutral focus upon change
in order to illuminate these changes.
Nevertheless, the Constitution, as inter-
preted through judicial review, becomes
more than a focus for attempting to
change; the Court must decide and
evaluate what changes are allowable.
To the extent that the Court does not
merely "allow" change, but also guides
change, it is not neutral. The conse-
quence of the Court's decisions may be
to interfere with legislation which at-
tempts to promote a specific relationship
between church and government.
Finally, the Constitution is neutral to
the extent that the alternative ideals
which are selected by the Court must be
appropriate to the political and historical
traditions of the country. Thus, the
Court is "neutral" in the sense that it
excludes absolute ideals which may be
irrelevant to the particular traditions and
power structure of America. The Con-
stitution may further be neutral to the
extent that the Court can find a middle
way between extreme ideals. But, the
Constitution, in embodying certain ideals,
and the Court, in articulating these
ideals, is not "neutral" but rather com-
mitted to discovering and setting forth
the best constitution for the United
States.
